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Abstract
Abnormal pattern prediction has received a great deal of attention from both academia
and industry, with applications that range from fraud, terrorism and intrusion detection
to sensor events, medical diagnoses, weather patterns, etc. In practice, most abnormal
pattern prediction problems are characterized by the presence of a small number of labeled
data and a huge number of unlabeled data. While this points most obviously to the adop-
tion of a semi-supervised approach, most empirical studies have opted for a simplification
and treated it as a supervised problem, resulting in a severe bias of false negatives. In
this paper, we propose an innovative methodology based on semi-supervised techniques
and introduce a new metric the Cluster-Score for abnormal homogeneity measurement.
Specifically, the methodology involves transmuting unsupervised models to supervised mod-
els using the Cluster-Score metric, which defines the objective boundaries between clusters
and evaluates the homogeneity of the abnormalities in the cluster construction. We apply
this methodology to a problem of fraud detection among property insurance claims. The
objectives are to increase the number of fraudulent claims detected and to reduce the pro-
portion of claims investigated that are, in fact, non-fraudulent. The results from applying
our methodology considerably improved these objectives.
Keywords: Outlier Detection, Semi-Supervised Models, Fraud, Cluster, Insurance
1. Introduction
The problem we seek to solve is the prediction of abnormalities in an environment with
highly unbalanced samples and a huge mass of unlabeled data. A typical example of such a
situation is provided by fraud detection. In general, we only have partial information about
fraud cases, as well as possibly some information about false positives, that is, cases that
are considered suspicious but which prove to be cases of non-fraud. The problem here is
that we cannot label these cases non-fraud simply because they were initially considered
suspicious. For this reason, we know nothing about non-fraud cases. Moreover, fraud tends
to be an outlier problem, given that we are dealing with atypical values with respect to
regular data. Hence, it is likely that we only dispose of information about an extremely
small sample. Yet, it so transpires, that this information is extremely useful and should not
be discarded. In contrast we have a considerable amount of data that may contain fraud




and or non-fraud cases and, as such, we cannot treat these data using traditional supervised
algorithms.
The problem, simply stated, therefore, is how can we predict these outliers? To represent
this typical case we apply an innovative semi-supervised methodology to a real fraud case.
Specifically, we draw on information provided by a leading insurance company as we seek to
predict fraudulent insurance claims. In general terms, such claims fall into two categories:
one, those that provide only partial or untruthful information in the policy contract; and,
two, those that are based on misleading or untruthful circumstances (including exaggera-
tions). It has been estimated that cases of detected and undetected fraud represent up to
10% of all claims in Europe (The Impact of Insurance Fraud, 2013), accounting for around
10-19% of the payout bill.
In the sector, the main services contracted are automobile and property insurance, repre-
senting 76% of total claim costs. However, while many studies have examined automobile
fraud detection (see, for example, Arts et al., 1999 and 2002; Viaene et al., 2007; Wilson,
2009; Nian et al., 2016), property fraud has been largely neglected, perhaps because detec-
tion is more difficult as witnesses are infrequent or typically tend to cohabitants.
Here, therefore, our main objective is to present a variety of semi-supervised machine learn-
ing models applied to a fraud detection problem. In so doing, we aim to develop a method-
ology capable of improving results in classification anomaly problems of this type. Our
reasoning for using semi-supervised models is best explained as follows. Statistically speak-
ing, fraud is a special case of outliers, that is, of points in the dataset that differ significantly
from the remaining data. Such anomalies often result from unusual events that generate
anomalous patterns of activity. Were we to use unsupervised models that is, were we
to assume that we are unable to distinguish between fraudulent and non-fraudulent cases
what we defined as outliers, noise or normal data would be subjective and we would have
to represent that noise as a boundary between normal data and true anomalies without any
information. But, as mentioned, the number of fraud cases detected is small; however, they
constitute a useful source of information that cannot be discarded.
On the other hand, supervised models are inappropriate because, in general, we face a major
problem of claim misclassifications when dealing with fraud detection (Arts et al., 2002).
Fraud detection, typically, comprises two stages: first, it has to be determined whether the
claim is suspicious or not (Viaene et al, 2007); and, second, all cases considered suspicious
have to be examined by fraud investigators to determine whether the claim is fraudulent or
not. This means that unsuspicious cases are never examined, which is reasonable in terms
of efficiency, especially if the process cannot be automatized. Insurance adjusters have little
time to perform an exhaustive investigation. Yet, the process does provide us with partial
information, that is, labels for what is a small sample. Clearly, using a supervised model
in this instance adds bias to the confusion matrix. Essentially, we will detect severe bias
in false negatives and, therefore, many cases which are in fact fraudulent will be predicted
as being non-fraudulent (Phua et al., 2004). Indeed, when using supervised algorithms we
assume that the system in place is capable of discerning perfectly between fraudulent and
non-fraudulent claims, an outcome that in practice is infrequent and referred to in the lit-
erature as an omission error (Bollinger and David, 1997; Poterba and Summers, 1995).
Clearly, the information provided in relation to those cases considered suspicious is more
likely to be specified correctly once we have passed the first stage in the fraud detection
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process. This information will be useful for a part of the distribution (that is, it will reveal if
a fraudulent claim has been submitted), which is why it is very important this information
be taken into account. For this reason, fraud detection is notorious for being considered a
semi-supervised problem because the ground truth labelling of the data is partially known.
Here, therefore, we seek to make three contributions to the literature: First, we apply in-
novative semi-supervised techniques to anomaly detection; second, we create a new metric
that permits us to evaluate the homogeneity of abnormalities in the cluster construction;
and, third, we apply this model to an actual property insurance claim fraud problem for
the first time, using a real dataset provided by a leading insurance company.
2. Metodhology
Outlier detection models seek to separate regular from outlier observations. If we have
labeled data, the easiest way to proceed is by employing a supervised algorithm. However,
in the case of fraud, this implies our knowing everything about the two classes of observa-
tion that is, we would know exactly who did and did not commit fraud, a situation that is
extremely rare. In contrast, if we know nothing about the labeling, that is, we do not know
who did and did not commit fraud, several unsupervised methods of outlier detection can
be employed, for example, isolation forest, one-class support vector machines, and elliptic
envelopment. However, they tend to be less precise and we have to assume some subjective
boundary.
If, however, we have some label data about each class, we can implement a semi-supervised
algorithm, such as label propagation or label spreading. Yet, these methods require that
we have some information about every class in our problem, something that is not always
possible. Indeed, disposing of label data information about each class is quite infrequent
in certain practical problems. Additionally, we face the problem of unbalanced data, which
means we rarely have clean, regular data representing the population. In fraud problems,
as a norm, the data are highly imbalanced and skewed, which results in a high but biased
success rate.
In the light of these issues, we propose an innovative semi-supervised technique that can
assess not only a highly unbalanced dataset problem but also one for which we have no infor-
mation about certain classes. In this regard, fraud detection represents an outlier problem
for which we can usually identify some, but not all, of the cases. We might, for example,
have information about false positives, that is, investigated cases that proved not to be
fraudulent. However, simply because they have raised suspicions does not mean they can
be considered representative of non-fraudulent cases. In short, what we usually have are
some cases of fraud and a large volume of unknown cases (among which it is highly likely
cases of fraud are lurking).
Bearing this in mind, we propose the application of unsupervised models so as to relabel
the target variable. To do this, we use an innovative metric that measures how well we
approximate the minority class. We can then transform the model to a semi-supervised
algorithm. On completion of the relabeling process, our problem can be simplified to a
supervised model. This allows us not only to set an objective boundary but to obtain a
3
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(a) Desired Clusters (b) Non-desired Clusters
Fig. 1. Possible clusters
gain in accuracy when using partial information, as Trivedi et al. (2014) have demonstrated.
2.1 Unsupervised Model Selection
We start with a dataset of 303,166 cases. We set aside a 10% random subset for final evalu-
ation. Hence, our dataset consists of 270,479 non-identified cases and 2,370 cases of fraud.
The main problem we face in this unsupervised model is having to define a subjective bound-
ary. We have partial information about fraud cases, but have to determine an acceptable
threshold at which an unknown case can be considered fraudulent. When calculating unsu-
pervised classification models, we reduce the dimensions to clusters. Almost every algorithm
will return several clusters containing mixed-type data (fraud and unknown). Intuitively,
we would want the fraud points revealed to be highly concentrated into just a few clusters.
Likewise, we would expect some non-revealed cases to be included with them, as in Figure
1.a:
On the other hand, we would want to avoid situations in which abnormal and normal
cases are uniformly distributed between groups, as in Figure 1.b. However, a limit of some
kind has to be defined. But, how many of the unknown cases can we accept as being
fraudulent?
A boundary line might easily be drawn so that we accept only cases of detected fraud or we
accept every possible case as fraudulent. Yet, we know this to be unrealistic. If we seek to
operate between these two both extremes, intuition tells us that we need to stay closer to
the lower threshold, accepting only cases of fraud and very few more, as Figure 2 illustrates.
But once more, we do not know exactly what the correct limit is. In this way, however,
we have created an experimental metric that can help us assign a score and, subsequently,
define the threshold. This metric, which we shall refer to as the cluster score (CS), calcu-
lates the weighted homogeneity of clusters based on the minority and majority classes.
CS = (1 + α2)
C1 ∗ C2
C1 + C2 ∗ α
Essentially, it assigns a score to both the minority-class (C1) and the majority-class (C2)
clusters based on the weighted conditional probability of each point. The mathematical
4
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Fig. 2. Desired threshold
(a) Unsupervised output (b) Relabeled clusters
Fig. 3. Possible clusters
formulation can be consulted in Appendix 1.
We should stress that each time we retrieve more information about the one-class cases that
have been revealed, this threshold improves. This is precisely where the entropy process of
machine learning appears. In the one-class fraud problem discussed above, we start with
an unknown distribution for which some data points are known (that is, the fraud sample).
Our algorithms, using the CS proposed, will gradually get closer to the best model that
can fit these cases of fraud, while maintaining a margin for undiscovered cases. Now, if
we obtain new information about fraud cases, our algorithms will readjust to provide the
max CS again. As the algorithms work with notions based on density and distances, they
change their shapes to regularize this new information.
Once the best unsupervised model is attained (that is, the model that reaches the max CS),
we need to decide what to do with the clusters generated. Basically, we need to determine
which clusters comprise fraudulent and which comprise non-fraudulent cases. The difficulty
is that several cluster will be of mixed-type: that is, minority-class points (fraud cases)
and unidentified cases, as in Figure 3.a, where the 0s are unidentified cases and the 1s are
minority-class points.
In defining a threshold for a fraud case, we make our strongest assumption. Here, we
assume that if a cluster is made up of more than 50% of fraud cases, this cluster is a
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fraud cluster, otherwise, it is a non-fraud cluster. The distinction introduced is clear: The
non-fraud cluster is no longer an unidentified cluster. By introducing this assumption, we
state that they are actually non-fraudulent cases. This definition acts as the key for our
transition into a semi-supervised model.
As Figure 3.b shows, cluster 1, being composed of more than 50% fraud cases, now forms
part of the more general fraud cluster, together, obviously, with the fraud cases already
detected. The remaining cases that do not belong to such a dense fraud cluster are now
considered non-fraud cases.
The unsupervised algorithm can thus be summarized as follows:
Algorithm 1 Unsupervised Algorithm
1. Load dataset: Overweight fraud cases given the same weight as unknown cases.
2. Iterate through model k and the vector of tuning parametersi.
3. j clusters will generate for each k, i. that is Ci,k = {C1i,k, C2i,kCni,k}.
4. For each Cji,k we calculate C1 and C2 (see Appendix), and obtain the cluster score
CSi,k.
5. We define the acceptable threshold t∗ for a cluster to be considered a fraud cluster or
not.
6. We choose the optimal CS∗ where CS∗ = argmax{CSI,K}, CSI,K is the cluster
vector for each pair k, i.
7. We relabel the fraud variable using the optimal clustering model derived from CS∗.
Each unknown case in a fraud cluster is now equal to 1. Known fraud cases are equal
to 1. Remaining cases are equal to 0.
2.2 Supervised Model Selection
We now have a redefined target variable that we can continue working with by applying
an easy-to-handle supervised model. The first step involves resampling the fraud class to
avoid unbalanced sample problems. We oversample the dataset to obtain a 50/50 balanced
sample.
The second step involves conducting a grid search and a ten cross-validation (CV) based
on the F-Score1 to obtain the optimal parameters for three different models: extreme ran-
domized tree, gradient boosting and a light XGB. Additionally, we combine these classifiers
using stacking models.
Once we have the optimal parameters for each, we calculate the optimal threshold that
defines the probability of a case being fraudulent or non-fraudulent, respectively.
1. The F-Score was constructed using β = 2, as we needed to place greater weight on the recall.
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Finally, we identify the two models that perform best on the combined valid/test dataset
the best acting as our main model implementation, the other controlling that the predicted
claims are generally consistent.
Algorithm 2 Supervised Algorithm
1. Load dataset with the relabeled target variable. Oversampling to obtain a 50/50
balance sample.
2. Apply grid search and CV to obtain the optimal parameters based on the F-Score
results for each Mi model.
3. Generate stacking models Sj using different combinations of metaclassifiers based on
the Mi models.
4. Obtain the optimal threshold for each Mi and Sj based on F-Score results.
5. Identify the best two models. The best model is Base Model B∗. And the second best
is Control Model C∗.
6. Finalize the output probabilities.
3. Data
We use an insurance fraud dataset provided by a leading insurance company in Spain for
the period 2015-2016. After sanitization, our main sample consists of 303,166 property
claims, some of which have been analyzed as possible cases of fraud by the Investigation
Office (IO)2.
Of the cases analyzed by the IO, 48% proved to be fraudulent. A total of 2,641 cases were
resolved as true positives (0.8% of total claims) during the period under study. This means
we do not know which class the remaining 99.2% of cases belong to. However, the fraud
cases detected provide very powerful information, as they reveal the way in which fraudu-
lent claims behave. Essentially, they serve as the pivotal cluster for separating normal from
abnormal data.
A data lake was constructed during the process to generate sanitized data. We obtain 19
bottles containing different types of information related to accident claims. These bottles
contain variables derived from the companys daily operation, and variables that are trans-
formed in several of their aspects. In total we have almost 1,000 variables. We briefly
present them here to help explain which concepts were chosen for the model.
4. Results
Table 2 shows the main unsupervised modeling results. Mixed models tend to provide the
best results. However, mini-batch K-means is not only much faster, it also provides the




Id ID about accident, policy, person, etc.
Customer Policyholders attributes embodied in insurance policies: name, sex, age, address, etc.
Customer-Property Customer related with the property data
Dates Dates of about accident, policy, visits, etc.
Guarantees Coverage and guarantees of the subscribed policy
Property Data related to the insured object
Payments Policy payments made by the insured
Policy Policy contract data, including changes, duration, etc.
Loss-Adjuster Information about the process of the investigation but also about the loss adjuster
Accident Brief, partial information about the accident, including date and location
Intermediary Information about the policies intermediaries.
Customer-Object-Reserve The coverage and guarantees involved in the accident
Historical Accident Historical movements associated with the reference accident
Historical Policy Historical movements associated with the reference policy (the policy involved in the accident).
Historical Other Policies Historical movements of any other policy (property or otherwise) related to the reference policy.
Historical Other Accident Historical accident associated with the reference policy (excluding the accident analyzed).
Historical Other Policy-Accident Other accident associated with other policies not in the reference policy (but related to the customer).
Black List Every participant involved in a fraudulent claim (insured, loss-adjuster, intermediary, other professionals, etc).
Cross Variables Several variables constructed with the interaction between the bottles.
Table 1. Data Bottles
best results, returning four clusters. More than 90% of the cases in the central cluster
are fraudulent (well above our 50% threshold), but it also contains an additional 8,540
unknown cases. This is our core fraud cluster and the one we use when renaming the original
labels. We also have a small fraud cluster with an additional 16 cases. C1 indicates that
the minority-class (fraud) clusters comprise 92.9% of minority data points on a weighted
average. In contrast, C2 indicates they are made up of 92.8% of unknown cases.
Model Parameter 1 Parameter 2 n Clusters C1 C2 Cluster Score Time
Mini-Batch K-Means Iterations= 100 Batch Size = 600 4 92.9% 92.8% 92.8% 3 sec.
Isolation Forest Contamination= 0.125 nestim = 100 2 51.5% 51.1% 51.4% 5min-18min
DBSCAN Does not change Does not change 2 50.2% 49.8% 50.1% 15-80min
Gaussian Mixture Cov= Tied Tol= 0.29 5 95.0% 95.0% 96.3% 23min
Bayesian Mixture Cov= Tied Tol= 0.29 6 96.5% 96.4% 96.5% 23min
Table 2. Unsupervised model results
The tuning of each of the supervised models and of the stacking models is shown in Table
3. We first employ a validation set comprising 15% of the data to tune the parameters.
As can be appreciated, we have two recall values. The cluster recall is the metric derived
when using the relabeling target variable. The original recall emerges when we recover the
prior labelling (1 if it was fraud, 0 otherwise). As can be seen, the results are strikingly
consistent. We are able to predict fraud cluster with a recall of up to 91-98% in every case.
But, more impressively yet, we can capture the original fraud cases with a recall close to
99%. The precision is a little lower, but in almost all cases it is higher than 80%. These
are particularly good results for a problem that began as an unsupervised high-dimensional
problem in an extremely unbalanced one-class dataset.
After optimizing the models, we calculated the performance of the best models using
70/30 training-test dataset. The performance and confusion matrixes are shown in Figure
4. Both are extremely randomized trees: the first uses balance subsampling (ERT-ss) and
serves here as our base model; the second uses an ADASYN oversampling method (ERT
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Model Cluster Recall Original Recall Precision FBeta Treshold Time
ERT b-ss 96.7% 99.4% 81.8% 93.3% 0.539 3min
ERT b-s 97.3% 99.1% 81.7% 93.7% 0.507 10min
GB 91.0% 94.6% 74.0% 87.0% 0.634 6h30min
LXGB 91.3% 94.6% 84.1% 89.8% 0.688 4min
Stacking META=ERT 97.3% 99.2% 49.9% 81.8% 0.955 12hs
Stacking META=LXGB 93.1% 95.2% 84.0% 91.2% 0.552 12hs
Stacking META=GB 91.9% 95.2% 84.7% 90.4% 0.661 15min
Table 3. Supervised model results
b-s) and serves as our control model. The results continue to be consistent and they are
very rapid algorithms.
(a) Cluster target (b) Original target
Fig. 4. Base Model. ERT with subsampling
(a) Cluster target (b) Original target




At the outset, we randomly set aside 10% of the data (30,317 claims). In this final step, to
ensure we do not face any overfitting problems, we examine these initial data in a test of
the whole process. Our results are shown in Table 4.
Original Value Prediction Cases
NOT INVESTIGATED NOT FRAUD 29.631
FRAUD NOT FRAUD 0
NOT INVESTIGATED FRAUD 415
FRAUD FRAUD 271
(a) Base Model Robustness Check.
Original Value Prediction Cases
NOT INVESTIGATED NOT FRAUD 29.656
FRAUD NOT FRAUD 8
NOT INVESTIGATED FRAUD 390
FRAUD FRAUD 263
(b) Control Model Robustness Check.
Table 4. Model Robustness Check.
As can be appreciated, the control model (Table 4.b) has a recall of 97% while the base
model (Table 4.a) has an impressive recall of 100%. However, the added value depends on
the non-investigated fraud cases, that is, cases not previously detected but which would
boost our results if shown to be fraudulent. We, therefore, sent these cases to the IO for
analysis.
The IO investigated 367 cases (at the intersection between the control and base models).
Two fraud investigators analyzed each of these cases, none of which they had previously
seen as the rule model had not detected them.
Of these 367 cases, 333 were found to present a very high probability of being fraudulent.
This means that only 34 could be ruled out as not being fraudulent. Recall that from the
original sample of 415 cases, the fact that 333 presented indications of fraud means we have
a precision of 88%, which is perfectly consistent with our original test sample (83.3-84.9%).
In short, we managed to increase the efficiency of fraud detection by 122.8%. These final
outcomes are summarized in Table 5.
Original Value Prediction Cases
NOT INVESTIGATED NOT FRAUD 29.631
FRAUD NOT FRAUD 0
NOT FRAUD FRAUD (415 - 333) = 82
FRAUD FRAUD (271 + 333) = 604
Table 5. Base Model Final Results
6. Machine Learning Process
The machine learning process is not complete if we do not feed the model with new infor-
mation. A year later, we recalibrated the model with new data (see Table 6).
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PERIOD Jan15-Jan17 Jan15-Jan18
Claims 303,166 479,454
Observed Fraud 2,641 4,299
Cluster Score 92.8% 97.13%
Recall Score 96.4% 97.4%
Precision Score 83.3% 90.4%
Table 6. Base Model with the machine-learning process applied
The base model greatly improves the homogeneity of the fraud and non-fraud clusters.
In particular, it provides a gain of 7% in the precision score and a slight gain in the recall
score.
7. Conclusions
This paper has sought to offer a solution to the problems that arise when working with highly
unbalanced datasets for which the labelling of all the classes is unknown. In such cases, we
usually dispose of a few small samples that contain highly valuable information. Here, we
have presented a fraud detection case, drawing on the data provided by a leading insurance
company, and have tested a new methodology based on semi-supervised fundamentals to
predict fraudulent accident claims.
At the outset, the IO did not investigate many cases (around 7,000 cases from a total of
303,166). Of these, only 2,641 were actually true positives (0.8% of total claims), with a
success rate of 48%. Thanks to the methodology devised herein, we can now investigate the
whole spectrum of cases automatically, obtaining a total recall of 96-97% and a precision of
83-90%. In spite of the complexity of the initial problem, where the challenge was to detect
outliers without knowing anything about 99.2% of the sample, the methodology described
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Appendix A. Cluster Score
C1 Score
The C1 score calculates the probability that a revealed fraud point belongs to group J and
that this probability is weighted by the total number of fraud points in that group divided










where xjfraud is the revealed fraud point in cluster group j. X
T
j is the total number of points
in group J . And XTfraud is the total number of fraud cases revealed.







and we weight these values by the participation of its points in the fraud group revealed.
Our objective is to maximize C1; basically, this means ensuring all cases of revealed fraud
are in the same groups. The limit C1 = 1 implies that in the j groups we only have re-
vealed fraud points. However, this is not what we want. Therefore, we have to balance this
function with another function.
C2 Score
C2 is the inverse case of C1. Here, we calculate the probability of unrevealed fraud belong-










And the objective is the same as that above in the case of C1: to cluster this group
without assigning revealed fraud to these clusters.
Cluster Score
Individually maximizing C1 and C2 leaves us in an unwanted situation. Basically, they







we maximize one, we minimize the other. If we maximize both together, this results in a
trade-off between the two, a trade-off in which we can choose. Moreover, as pointed out
above, we actually want to maximize C1 subject to C2. Consequently, the fraud score is
constructed as follows:
CS = (1 + α2)
C1 ∗ C2
C1 + C2 ∗ α
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With α1. If α = 1, C1 and C2 will have the same weight. But if we assign α > 1, this
will reduce the charge of C2.
In conclusion, with this CS we have an objective parameter to tune the unsupervised model.
Basically, we can maximize CS. The only decision that remains for us is to determine the
relevance of α.
Practical Example

















Table 7. Class and Labels
The classes represent fraud (=1) and unlabeled (=0). The output label is the clustering
label. As can be seen, just 33% of cases represent detected fraud. If we group the class by
clusters:
Label Class Subtotal Class Total
1 0 4 4
1 1 0 4
2 0 2 6
2 1 4 6
3 0 4 5
3 1 1 5
Table 8. Grouping labels and classes
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As is evident, the fraud class tends to be assigned to the second cluster.
First we calculate C1.
C1 =
0
4 ∗ 0 + 46 ∗ 4 + 15 ∗ 1
5
= 0.5733
Then we calculate C2 using a similar formula.
C2 =
4
4 ∗ 4 + 26 ∗ 2 + 45 ∗ 4
10
= 0.7867
As can be seen, C1 gives worst results as its core group (group 2) is quite contaminated
(66% of observations actually correspond to cases of fraud). This effect represents 93% of
the total effect. The effect of mismatching the core group (1/5) is negligible, which stresses
the importance of constructing a strong core group.
This conclusion is notorious in the case of C2. Non-identified classes are highly robust in
two groups (1 and 3).
If we calculate the CS with α = 2 (balanced C1 and C2) we obtain:
CS = 0.602
which is a value very close to 0.5733. This formula allows us to balance our results, giving
greater weight to the lower score. We should stress we want both good and balanced scores;
thus, C1 = 0, C2 = 1 is not the same as C1 = 0.5, C2 = 0.5. Indeed, the former returns a
CS = 0. If we compare the mean with the CS:
C1 C2 Mean CS
0.0 1.0 0.5 0.00
0.1 0.9 0.5 0.18
0.2 0.8 0.5 0.32
0.3 0.7 0.5 0.42
0.4 0.6 0.5 0.48
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.50
0.6 0.4 0.5 0.48
0.7 0.3 0.5 0.42
0.8 0.2 0.5 0.32
0.9 0.1 0.5 0.18
1.0 0.0 0.5 0.00
Table 9. Grouping labels and classes
As can be seen, we obtain the same unbalanced scores as the balanced outcomes for the
mean score. CS penalizes the unbalanced scores. This is why we obtain different results
with the same proportions.
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However, we can make adjustments in terms of the relevance we attach to each group. If
we raise α, we penalize the C2 results, and vice versa.
What happens if we choose α > 2?
C1 C2 α = 2 α = 4 α = 6
0.1 0.9 0.05 0.02 0.02
0.2 0.8 0.09 0.05 0.03
0.3 0.7 0.14 0.07 0.05
0.4 0.6 0.17 0.10 0.07
0.5 0.5 0.20 0.12 0.08
0.6 0.4 0.22 0.14 0.10
0.7 0.3 0.22 0.15 0.11
0.8 0.2 0.20 0.16 0.12
0.9 0.1 0.14 0.14 0.12
Table 10. Grouping labels and classes
As is evident, we obtain two effects. First, while C1 increases, CS also increases (al-
though C2 decreases at the same rate). But the effect present in the balanced case now
extends further. When we are at C1 = 0.7, the balanced effect tends to reverse the situa-
tion. The second effect is that the score curve is shifted downward. CS is now demanding
more strongly that C1 be higher; while the higher the beta value the stronger C1.
Online Appendix 1. Data and Source Code
Data and source code can be founded here: http://github.com/sebalp1987/outlier_
model
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